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RAPHAEL KONIGSBERG, Petitioner, v. THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA et at, Respondents.
[1] Attorneys-Admi88ion to Bar-Eligibility-Loyalty to Government.-An applicant's persistent refusal to answer questions
put to him by the Committee of Bar Examiners concerning
either past or present membership in or affiliation with the
Communist Party after being warned that such conduct would
require denial of his certification to admission to practice
justified the cOlllmittee in refusing to certify him where, in
view of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6064.1, enjoining the committee against certifying for admission to practice any person
who "advocates the overthrow of the Government of the
United States or of this State by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means," which clearly requires the committee
to inquire as to such advocacy, and the fact that Congress
(68 Stat. 775; 50 U.S.C. § 841) and the state Legislature
(Gov. Code, § 1027.5) have declared that the Comlllunist
Party advocates such overthrow, the inquiry as to membership in that party was relevant and mat~rial in determining
whether the proscribed advocacy existed.

PROCEEDING to review action of the Committee of Bar
Examiners in refusing to certify petitioner for admission to
practice law and application to the Supreme Court for admission to practice. Petition for review and application
to Supreme Court denied.
Edward Mosk for Petitioner.
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and High R. Manes as Amici
.
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Frank B. Belcher, Robert D. Burch and Ralph E. Lewis
for Respondents.
THE COURT .-Petitioner seeks review of the action of the
Committee of Bar Examiners in refusing to certify him to
this court for admission to practice law in California. Also,
he has applied directly to this court for admission to practice.
The Committee of Bar Examiners is established by the
[1] See CaLJur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 38.
Mclt. Dig. Reference: [1] Attorneys, § 15.1.
52 C.2d·-2:i
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B(lllrl'l of Gov!'rnors or The Stat<.> Bar of California pursuant
to statutory aut.hority. It. ('ononds t.11P bar rxamiuations and

o

certifies directly to this court those applicants for admission
who fulfill the requirements of the code (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6046). This court may admit to practice any applicant so
certified (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6064). An applieant who
~ refu,sed certification lllay have the action of the committee
reviewed by this court (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6066).
The code specifically provides (§ 6064.1) that" [n] 0 person I
who advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means, shall be certified . . . for admission. . . ."
In October, 1953, petitioner took and passed the written bar
examination. Shortly before that examination, and on several
later occasions, hearings were conducted by a subcommittee
and the full Committee of Bar Examiners.
An ex-Communist testified that petitioner had attended '
meetings of a Communist Party unit in 1941. Petitioner offered much evidence of his satisfactory service in the Army
during World War II, and of his good character and loyalty.
The evidence of these hearings is reviewed in some detail in
the several opinions ill Konigsb('.rg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252
[77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810]. Petitioner denied that he
advocated overthro,v of the government, but refused to answer
any questions of committce members as to his membership in
the Communist Party, asserting that such inquiries infringed
rights guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The committee, by letter of May 17, 1954, advised petitioner
that his application was denied on grounds that he had not
sustained his burden of establishing that he (1) possessed
the good moral character required by section 6060, subdivision
(c), of the code, or (2) did not advocate unlawful overthrow
of the government, the showing required by section 6064.1.
Petitioner thereupon sought review by this court. His petition was denied April 20, 1955, without opinion, by a divided
court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
On May 6, 1957, that court, with thr<.>e justices dissenting alld
one not participating, reversed and remanded'the matter to
this court" for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion" (Ko1l·igsberg v. State Bar, supra, 353 U.S. 252).
In doing so, the United States Supreme Court held (p. 273)
that "there is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Konigsberg iniled to establish his good
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mOl'<lI cha.-ader or failed to show that he did \lot a,lvo"lIhl
forceful ovel·throw of the Government."
That court specifically pointed out (p. 259) that Koni:,.rsherl.!
"was not denied admission to the California Bar simply h('cause he refused to answer questions," and noted that he had
not been told that he would be barred" just because he refused
to answer relevant inquiries or because he was obstructing the
Committee." In this connection it was said (p. 261) that
"Serious questions of elemental fairness would be raised if
the Committee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he
failed to answer questions without first explicitly warning
him that he could be barred for this reason alone. . . ."
The court stated (353 U.S. at pp. 261-262) that "If it were
possible for us to say that the . . . [committee] had barred
Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions about
matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to
decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to freedom
of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification for our
straining to reach these difficult problems when the . . • [committee] itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion
of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State
makes failure to answer a question an independent ground for
exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise,
will have to determine whether the exclusion is constitutionally
permissible. We do not mean to intimate any view on that
problem here nor do 've mean to approve or disapprove Konigs.
berg's refusal to answer the particular questions asked him."
Following the remand, this court vacated its prior order
denying the petition for review and referred the entire matter,
including the application for admission to the bar filed with ml
by petitioner after the decision of the United States Supreme
Court, to the Committee of Bar Examiners for further proceedings. The committee conducted a hearing September 2],
1957.
At this hearing, the records of all previous hearings were
incorporated by stipulation as part of the record, petitioner
and a witness called by him were examined, and petitioner
introduced letters recommending him as to character and
loyalty. No evidence additional to that received in the 1953-1954
llearings was offered as reflecting on petitioner's loyalty or to
show his advocacy of overthrow of the government. Thus a
finding that he was not of good moral character or that he
advocated overthrow of the government would be inconsistent
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with the decision of the United States Supreme Court upon
the previous record.
At the 1957 hearing, however, the committee did fully advise
petitioner and his counsel that his refusal to answer material
questions put to him by it would obstruct its investigation of
his qualifications to practice law, with the result. that the
committee would not be able to certify him for admission. It
was made clear to him that questions concerning membership
in the Communist Party were deemed material. Nonetheless,
petitioner refused to answer any and all questions put to him
by the committee concerning either past or present membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party. The committee then found that Konigsberg had refused to answer its
questions as to his membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party, that these questions were material to a proper
determination of his qualifications, that his refusal to answer
had obstructed the investigation which the statute requires,
and that because of this refusal the committee is unable to
certify him for admission.
It is this action which petitioner seeks to have reviewed. It
differs materially from that of 1954. The committee action
now before us contains no findings or conclusion that petitioner had failed to establish either his good moral character
or his abstention from advocacy of overthrow of the government.
[1] Here it is the refusal to answer material questions
which is the basis for denial of certification. Petitioner's
refusal to answer is conceded. The issue is whether the questions are material. We think their materiality is clear. The
committee is enjoined against certifying for admission to
practice any person who "advocates the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means." (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6064.1.) This provision clearly requires the committee to
inquire as to such advocacy.. The Congress (68 Stat. 775; 50
U.S.C. § 841) and the California Legislature (Gov. Code,
§ 1027.5) have declared that the Communist Party does advocate such overthrow. It follows that inquiry as to membership
in that party is relevant and" material in determining whether
the proscribed advocacy exists. Petitioner refused to answer
questions as to such membership at periods after the statutory
proscription and after the legislative declarations of the pur.
pose of the Communist Party. As we have 11oted, he persisted
in his refusal after being warned that such conduct would be
deemed to require denial of his certification by the committee.
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Wf! are l.llIahll' tn distinguish this :-ilnat ion frolll that. prcsentcd in Reiffl" v. B(I(u-d ()f Public Rd1INI.tioll, 357 U.S. 399
[78 S.Ct. 1317, 1324, 2 L.Ed_2d 1414, 1433]. 'l'hl'('(~ a school
teacher refused to answer questions as to his loyalty. This
refusal was made the basis for a finding of "incompetency."
There, as here, there was no finding that the individual was
in fact disloyal, but merely a finding that his refusal to
answer questions pertinent to his IO~'alty revealed a lack of
candor which constituted unfitness. Our case is somewhat
stronger in that here a statute specifically requires the committee to certify that petitioner does not advocate overthrow
of the government, and the question as to party membership
bears upon that issue. In Beilan, as here, there was no r1l II'
specifically providing that the failure to answer would be
deemed ground for adverse action, but here, as there, the
investigating authority gave clear warning that such a result
would follow.
In its previous decision in this case, the United States Supreme Court held only that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain a finding that petitioner is not of good moral character.
'l'he present record contains no additional evidence on that
subject. However, the refusal to certify for admission ic;, on
the present record, based wholly upon his refusal to answer
pertinent questions. This ground wac; specifically left open
in the earlier decision of that court aud subsequent decisions
have recognized this fact. (Beilan v. Board of Public Education, supra, p. 409; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 478 [78
S.Ct. 1311, 1324, 2 L.Ed.2d 1423, 1433].)
Determination whether petitioner was a member of the
party which has been legislatively determined to advocate
overthrow of the government was blocked by his refusal to
answer. Such refusal likewise effectively prevented the committee from reaching the question whether, if he were such
a member, his membership wac; knowing or innocent. The
committee's refusal to recommend him for admission W8!ol
based upon his refu!olnl to answer inquiries about his relevant
activities-not upon those activitie!ol thE'mselves. Thus its refusal is fully justified under the rule of Beilan, which dispose!ol
of his claim that his constitutional rights have been infringed.
Petitioner docs not question tll(, constitutionality of the
code section whieh prohibits certification of one who advocates unlawful overthrow of the government, nor of the federal and !;tate legishitive declarations that the Communist
Party seel;:s snell o\·erthrow. Implicit in tll<" statutory provi-
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sion for review of the committee's refusal to certify an appli·
{'ant is the power of this court to admit one not so certified.
But to admit applicants who refuse to answer the committee's
questions upon these subjects would nullify the concededly
yalid .legislative direction to the committee. Such a rule would
effectively stifle committee inquiry upon issues legislatively
declared to be relevant to that issue. We cannot in good
conscience deny the committee the right to inquire into a
matter as to which it must certify. Whether the members of
this court consider such a statute effective, practical or wise
is irrelevant. We do not act in a legislative capacity. Rather,
we recognize and enforce legislation which is valid.
We adopt and approve the finding;; of the committee stated
in the 1957 report. The petition for review and the application for admission to the bar are denied.
Gibson, C. J., deeming himself disqualified, did not participate.
Draper, J., sat pro tempore· in place of the Chief Justice.
White, J., not having been a member of the court at the
time of oral argument, did not participate:
TRAYNOR, Acting C. J.-I dissent.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that
Konigsberg was denied due process of law and equal protection of the laws on the ground that "the evidence does
not rationally support the only two grounds upon which the
Committee relied in rejecting his application for admission to the California Bar." (Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252, 262 [77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810].) In its
words, "there is no evidence in the record whieh rationally
justifies a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish his good
moral character or failed to show that he did not advocate
forceful overthrow of the Government. Without some authentic reliable evidence of unlawful or immO'l'al actions reo
fleeting adversely upon him, it is difficult to comprehend why
the State Bar Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's
background and Cllal'acter as morally unfit to practice law."
(353 U.S. at 273.)
It declined to determine whether Konigsberg could be ex* As~ign",l by Acting Chairman of Judicial Council.

i
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I'luded from practice solely because of his refusal to answer
quest.ions, stating:
"There is nothing in t.he California statutes, t.he California
ciel'isions, or even in the Rules of t.he Bar Committee, which
has heen raUed to our attention, that suggests that failure
to answer a Bar Examiner's inquiry is, ipso facto, a basis
for excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how
ovenvhelming is his showing of good character or loyalty
or how flimsy are the suspicions of the Bar Examiners. Serious questions of elemental fairness would be raised if the
Committee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he failed
to answer questions without first explicitly warning him that
he could be barred for this reason alone, even though his
moral character and loyalty were unimpeachable, and then
giving him a chance to comply. In our opinion, there is
nothing in the record which indicates that the Committee, in
a matter of such grave importance to Konigsberg, applied
a brand new exclusionary rule to his application-all without
telling him that it was doing so.
"If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred
Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its
inquiries into his political associations and his opinions about
matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to
decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to freedom of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification
for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the
Board itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion
of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State
makes failure to answer a question an independent ground i
for exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases
arise, will have to determine whether the exclusion is constitutionally permissible. We do not mean to intimate
any view on that problem here nor do we mean to approve
or disapprove Konigsberg's refusal to answer the particular
questions asked him." (353 U.S. at 260, 262, footnotes
omitted.)
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of this court and remanded the case "for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion." (353 U.S. at 274.) In
view of the questions expressly left undecided and the court's
remand, it is my opinion that this court is not foreclosed
by the United States Suprl'lUe Court's decision in this case
from adopting and applying to Konigsberg a rule making
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failure to answer rl'levant questions with respect to his qualifications an independent ground for exclusion.
An applicant ordinarily has the burden of establishing his
. qualifications to practice law, and if he refuses to answt'r
questions relevant to his qualifications, it is my opinion that
this court is justified in denying him admission. Given the
congressional and state legislative findings with regard to
the Communist Party and the adjudications of guilt of its
leaders of criminal advocacy, a question as to present or past
membership in that party is relevant to the issue of possible
criminal advocacy and hence to the applicant's qualifications.
Whatever its relevancy in a particular context, however,
it is an extraordinary variant of the usual inquiry into
crime, for the attendant burden of proof upon anyone under
question poses the immediate threat of prior restraint upon
the free speech of all applicants. The possibility of inquiry
into their speech, the heavy burden upon them to establish
its innocence, and the evil repercussions of inquiry despite
innocence, would constrain them to speak their minds so noncommittally that no one could ever mistake their innocuous
words for advocacy. This grave danger to freedom of speech
could be averted without loss to legitimate investigation by
shifting the burden to the examiners. Confronted with a
prima facie case, an applicant would then be obliged to
rebut it.
Such a procedure is logically dictated by Spe·iser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1352, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460]. The
court there assumed that the state could deny a tax exemption
to one whose advocacy of the unlawfnl overthrow of the
government was such that it could be punished as a crime.
Mindful of the risks to free speech, however, it took care to
hold that the state could not compel the taxpayer to prove
his right to an exemption and that therefore an oath as to
his innocence of unlawful advocacy could not be required.
There may be differences of degree in the p~blic interest.in
the fitness of the applicants for tax exemption and for admission to the Bar. Even though the state may have more
at stake in the latter situation, it is not therefore freer to
cndanger free speech needlessly.
Inquiry on the issue of advocacy of the unlawful overthrow of the government is a greedy camel; it does not easily
take its leave. It has a way of moving on into the domain
of lawful economic and political belief, !!peech, and activity.
It bears noting that such advocacy, whether it carries crimi·
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11al or civil sanctions, is lInlikE' ,· ..illll·X whosl' "lement.s readily
set them apart from ]{·gitimatl' 1I!'livit.y. (C/., Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137],
with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 [77 S.Ct. 1064,
1 hEd.2d 1356].) It a1<;0 bears noting that such advocacy
is not invariably associated with even active membership in
the Communist Party. (Yates v. United States, supra.)
Such considerations as these may have led to the result
in Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. 513. In contrast an
applicant for public employment can be required to state
whether or not he is or was a member of the Communist Party,
as a condition of his employment. (Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S.
468 [78 S.Ct. 1311, 2 L.Ed.2d 1423] ; Bel1an v. Board 0/ Public
Education, 357 U.S. 399 [78 S.Ct. 1317, 1324, 2 L.Ed.2d
1414, 1433] ; Steinmetz v. California State Board 0/ Education,44 Ca1.2d 816, 823 [285 P.2d 617] ; Pockman v. Leonard,
39 Cal.2d 676, 685-687 [249 P.2d 267].) Since an attorney
is neither a public employee nor a taxpayer seeking an exemption, we do not know how the United States Supreme Court
would resolve the constitutional issue here. Still, it has emphasized t.he importance of an independent Bar, Rnd it has
declared that petitioner's insistence on a constitutional right
not to answer the questions here illvolYl'tl was not frivolous.
(Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 270, 273 [77 S.Ct.
722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810].)
We need not resolve the constitutional question, for the
Legislature has not directed that section 6064.1 of the Business and Professions Code- be enforced by compelling applicants to answer all questions relevant to the proscribed
advocacy, and significantly, it has not required declarations
of nonadvocacy from members of the Bar. It rests solely
with this court, in its supervision of admissions to the Bar,
to determine whether petitioner must answer the questions
in issue. The question is not whether the Legislature might
constitutionally impose such requirements ,but whether this
court should impose them. There is no good reason for the
court to do so, particularly when the Legislature has made
110 attempt to impose them on practicing attorneys.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that
Konigsberg established his good moral character and that
·"No person who advoea.tes the overthrow of the Government of the
United States or of this State by foree, violenee, or other uneonstitutional means, sllall be eertified to the Supreme Court for admission and
:1 Ii .. ense to practice law."

)
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he did not advocate unlawful overthrow of the government.
In the subsequent hearing there was no additional evidence
adverse to Konigsberg. The committee did no more than
make clear to him that his failure to answer would be an
independent ground for not certifying him to this court.
Konigsberg chose to stand on his constitutional objections,
and as the United States Supreme Court pointed out, there
is "nothing in the record which indicates that his position
was not taken in good faith." (353 U.S. at 270.) If the
committee had evidence that would support a finding of
unlawful advocacy, it could compel Konigsberg to disclose
political statements and associations in rebuttal or forego
admission to the Bar. As the United States Supreme Court
held, the committee made no prima facie case against Konigsberg, and we are bound by that holding. I would therefore
grant the petition of Konigsberg and admit him to the Bar
of this state.

C)

PETERS, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion disregards the law of this case as
already established by the United States Supreme Court.
(Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 [77 8.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.
2d 810].) It misconstrnes the high court's opinion, and in
particular misconstrues the legal effect of the order of that
court remanding the case" for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." (Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. at p. 274.) The result is that, in my opinion, applicant
has been denied due process and equal protection.
The only issues before The State Bar in its first proceeding
were whether the applicant was of good moral character and
whether he advocated the forceful overthrow of the government of the United States. The burden was upon applicant
to establish those facts. Lengthy hearings were held. At
these hearings applicant furnished overwhelming evidence of
his good moral character and of the fact that he did not
advocate and had never advocated the forceful overthrow
of the government. He refused to answer any question as to
his political affiliations. The State Bar refused to certify
the applicant for admission 011 the ground that he llad failed
to sustain his burden on the two issues involved. The applicant sought review by this conrt. The petition was denied
without opinion. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. That court then reversed this court and The
State Bar and held that the applicant llad sustained his
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hurden of proof on the two key iSllues, and that on the
showing made the applicant should have been ccrtified for
admission. The case was remanded "for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion." (Konigsberg v. Sta.te
Bar, 353 U.S. at p. 274.)
Following this remand this court, by a divided vote, instead
of certifying the applicant, vacated its prior order and referred the case back to The State Bar for further proceedings. No showing was then or later made that any new evidence or facts had been discovered. The State Bar then held
a so-called hearing. It was stipulated that the entire prior
record should be introduced. The State Bar had admittedly
hired an investigator to check on the" applicant while the
case had been pending in the courts, but it did not produce
him or offer any evidence at all. The. petitioner produced
additional evidence in further support of his contentions
that he was of good moral character and a loyal citizen. No
question was asked him that had not been asked on the prior
hearing, and no answer was given that had not already been
given. The only difference between the two hearings was
that at the.last one petitioner was warned that his failure to
answer questions as to his political affiliations could be construed as lack of cooperation that would justify a denial of
his application.
Thus petitioner, in the first hearing, presented overwhelming
evidence that he was of good moral character and a loyal
citizen. The highest court in the land so held. Then, on precisely that same record, the record that the high court had
held demonstrated that the applicant had sustained his burden
as a matter of law, the majority of this court have held that
The State Bar properly denied certification because this time
applicant was warned that the failure to answer certain questions would be construed as lack of cooperation. How many
times does the issue of whether applicant possesses a good
moral character and is a loyal citizen have to be tried' Those
were the issues presented. Having sustained his -burden as to
those issues, on what rational theory ean it be held that The
State Bar, at this late date, with no new evidence, can offer
a new and different excuse for denying certification' When
does this litigation (~()me to an end' I hac' always thought,
until I read the majo,·ity opilliol1 ill this cast', that our !!ystt'11I
of law was predieated on the fnlldallwlltal theory that, whell
issues betwrrn litigants have once be!'n determined, they call-
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not be relitigated. I had always thought that litigants were
required to raise all relevant issues in one proceeding. I had
assumed that parties cannot litigate their case piecemeal.
The majority purport to find sanction for this violation !
of fundamental principles in the order of the United States
Supreme Court, heretofore quoted, remanding the ease "for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion"
(Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. at p. 274), and in several
sentences contained in the opinion. The majority do not
quote all the relevant language. At page 259 of the high
court opinion appears the following:
"In Konigsberg's petition for review to the State Supreme
Court there is no suggestion that the Committee had excluded
him merely for failing to respond to its inquiries. Nor did the
Committee in its answer indicate that this was the basis for
its action. After responding to Konigsberg's allegations,
the Bar Committee set forth a defense of its action which in
substance repeated the reasons it had given Konigsberg in the
formal notice of denial for rejecting his application.
"There is nothing in the California statutes, the California
decisions, or even in the Rules of the Bar Committee, which
has been called to our attention, [and there is still nothing
in such statutes, decisions or rules] that suggests that failure
to answer a Bar Examiner's inquiry is ipso facto, a basis for
excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how
overwhelming is his showing of good character or loyalty or
how flimsy are the suspicions of the Bar Examiners. Serious
questions of elemental fairness would be raised if the Committee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he failed to
answer questions without first explicitly warning him that
he could be barred for this reason alone, even though his moral
character and loyalty were unimpeachable, and then giving
him a chance to comply. In our opinion, there is nothing in
the record which indicates that the Committee, in a matter
of such grave importance to Konigsberg, applied a brand new
exclusionary rule to his application-all without telling him
that it was doing so.
•
"If it were possible for us to say that the Board had
barred Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to
its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions
about matters of publ ic interest, then we would be compelled
to decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to freedom of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification
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for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the !
Board itself has not. seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion
of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State
makes failure to answer a question an independent ground for ,
exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise,
- will-have to determine whether the exclusion is constitutionally
permissible. We do not mean to intimate any view on that
problem here nor do we mean to approve or disapprove
Konigsberg's refusal to answer the particular questions
asked him. "
The majority opinion interprets the remanding order and
the above-quoted portion of the opinion as a direction, or at :
least an authorization, to return the proceeding to The State
Bar to permit it to refuse certification solely on the ground
that Konigsberg had refused to cooperate by refusing to
answer questions about his political affiliations. This is not a
correct interpretation of the remanding order. Obviously,
what the Supreme Court meant by the quotation, supra, is
that California has never adopted a statute or a rule making
failure to answer, ipso facto, a ground for refusal to certify,
and that The State Bar could not properly contend that on
the record there involved such was a valid- ground for refusal
to certify. Without such a statute or rule the point could not
be urged. Certainly the Supremf' Court could not have meant
that without a statute or rule the Board of Bar Examiners
could create a "rule" simply by warning Konigsberg that
the effect of refusal to answer would be to cause the board
to refuse his certification. Such a warning, coming four years
after Konigsberg first appeared before the committee, does
not comply with rules of "elemental fairness" as required
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Rules for admission to practice law are not to be adopted
in this cavalier fashion. The only rules passed by the Legislature provide that the applicant must be of good moral
character, and must not advocate the forceful overthrow.
There is no rule about failing to answer. If California i8
to adopt a new rule relating to failure to answer questioDl!,
such rule or statute should be adopted in the manner rules
and statutes are normally adopted. Here the so-called "rule" I
was adopted in the middle of a proceeding as an afterthought
simply to justify the actions of the Bar Committee in refusing
to certify Konigsberg for admission. To sanction such a pro-
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cedure is not only unfair but., in my opinion, a denial of due
process and equal protection.
After the careful review of the evidence made by the United
States Supreme Court, and after holding that such evidence
did not justify the refusal to certify, when the high court
remanded the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion" it meant, and must have meant, that this
court was to grant the petition of Konigsberg, unless new facts
relating. to character or loyalty were produced. Any other
action was necessarily inconsistent with the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Of course, had The State Bar made a showing that after
the first hearings and while the case was on appeal it had
discovered new evidence that Konigsberg was not of good
moral character and not a loyal citizen, the case could have
been remanded to The State Bar to hear and consider that
evidence. But no such showing was made and no such evidence produced.
Thus the majority opinion, in my view, violates the remand
order of the United States Supreme Court.
In addition, the majority opinion also violates the law of
the case as established by the high court. As already pointed
out, all of the questions Konigsberg refused to 8J:!.swer were
addressed to the inquiry as to whether he was or had been a
member of the Communist Party. The only legitimate purpose behind those questions was to ascertain whether Konigsberg advocated or had ever advocated the forceful overthrow
of the government of the United States. Konigsberg answered,
and answered frankly, every question directed to that subject.
The State Bar produced no evidence to the contrary. In disc~ing the answers given by Konigsberg, the United States
Supreme Court (Konigsbe,.g v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, at
p. 271) had this to say: "Konigsberg repeatedly testified under
oath before the Committee [and he gave similar answers at
the last hearing] that he did not believe in nor advocate the
overthrow of any government in this country by any unconstitutional means. For example, in response to one question
as to whether he advocated overthrowing-the Government,
he emphatically declared: 'I answer specifically I do not, I
never did or never will.' No witness testified to the contrary.
As a matter of fact, many of the witnesses gave testimony
which was utterly inconsistent with the premise that he WM
disloyal. And Konigsberg to1<1 the Committee that he was
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ready at any .lime to take au oath to uphold the Constitution
of the United States and t.he Coustitutiou of California."1
There is no evidence that Kouigsberg now or at allY other
t.ime has ever advocated the forceful ovC'rthrow, or ('wr be- ,
longed to any association that he knew so advocatC'll. The
evidence is all to the contrary. 'fhe United StatC's Sllprcme'
Court after reviewing the evidence then before it, and llO
other evidence has been produced on the issue, had this to say
(K()1Iigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, at p. 273) : "We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own
bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise
this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor iu '
such way as to impinge 011 the freedom of political expression
or association. A bar composed of lawyers of good character'
is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital
freedoms in order to obtain that goal. It is also important
both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated
-free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent
Bar. In this case we are compelled to conclude that there is
no evide'Me in the record which rationally justifies a finding
that Kcmigsberg failed to establish his good moral character
or failed to show that he did not advocate forceful overthrow
of the Government. [Italics added.] Without some authentic
reliable evidence of unlawful or immoral actions reflecting
adversely upon him, it is difficult to comprehend why the
State Bar Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's background and character as morally unfit to practice law. As we
said before, the mere fact of Konigsberg's past membership
in the Communist Party, if true, without anything more, is
not an adequate basis for concluding that he is disloyal or a
person of bad character. A lifetime of good citizenship is
worth very little if it is so frail that it cannot withstand
the suspicions which apparently were the basis for the Committee's action."
It must be remembered that at the various hearings Konigsberg produced evidence of 54 persons who testified in cletail
about almost every phase of his adult life. Not one word or
one bit of evidence was procluced to show that Konigsberg
had ever committed a wrongful, improper or disloyal act.
The evidenee was all to the contrary. Applicant himself
testified tlmt IH~ did 1I0t and neVt'I' had advocated the for('e£1I1
'This is the oath required by California la.w-Business and Professions
Code, lIeetion 6067,
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overthrow. The United States Supreme Court was much
impressed by this testimony. An examination of that court 'Ii
opinion will demonstrate to a certainty that it held that, on
the record before it, and the present record is stronger in
this respect, Konigsberg had affirmatively demonstrated that
he possessed a good moral character and was a loyal citizen.
This is the law of this case.
The high court stated that the issue before it was "Does
the evidence in the record support any reasonable doubts
about Konigsberg's good character or his loyalty to the Governments of the State and Nation T•••
"Konigsberg claims that he established his good moral
character by overwhelming evidence and carried the burden
of proving that he does not advocate overthrow of the Government. He contends here, as he did in the California court,
that there is no evidence in the record which rationally supports a finding of doubt about his character or loyalty.... If
this is true, California's refusal to admit him is a denial of
due process and. of equal protection of the laws because both
arbitrary and discriminatory. After examination of the
record, we are compelled to agree with Konigsberg that the
evidence does not rationally support the only two grounds
upon which the Committee relied in rejecting his application ..• " (353 U.S. at p. 262.)
Then, after referring to the evidence produced by Konigsberg on the issue of his character, the court stated (353 U.S.
at p. 265) : "Other witnesses testified to Konigsberg's belief
in democracy and devotion to democratic ideas, his principled
convictions, his honesty and integrity, his conscientiousness
and competence in his work, his concern and affection for
his wife and children and his loyalty to the country. These,
of course, have traditionally been the kind of qualities that
make up good moral character. The significance of the statements made by these witnesses about Konigsberg is enhanced
by the fact that they had known him as an adult while he
was employed in responsible professional positions. Even
more significant, not a single person has tesj;ified that Konigsberg's moral character was bad or questionable in any way."
After referring to evidence of Konigsberg's background the
court refers to this evidence of character as "Konigsberg's
forceful showing of good moral character" and comments on
the fact that "there is no evidence that he has ever been convicted of any crime or has ever done anything base or depraved" the high court refers to eertain arguments of The
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State Bar and concludes "When the:;e items are analyzed, we
helievc it cannot rationally be said that they lSupport sub~tantial doubts about Konigsberg's moral fitness to practiee
law." (353 U.S. at p. 266.) This is the law of this case.
Then, after analyzing all the evidence on this issue relied
upon by The State Bar, the court stated: "On the record
before us, it is our judgment that the inferences of bad moral
character which the Committee attempted to draw from
Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions about his political
affiliations and opinions are unwarranted." (353 U.S. at
p.270.)
After discussing at length the evidence that The State Bar
relied upon to show possible advocacy of forceful overthrow,
the United States Supreme Court concluded with the statement already quoted but which bears repetition: "In this
c~ase we are compellrd to conclude that there is no evidence
in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish his good moral character or failed to
show that he did not advocate forceful overthrow of the Government. . .. it is difficult to comprehend why the State Bar
Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's background and
character as morally unfit to practice law. . . . A lifetime of
good citizenship is worth very little if it is so frail that it
cannot withstand the suspicions which apparently were the
basis for the Committee's action. JJ (353 U.S. at p. 273.)
This, too, is the law of this case.
'rhus it is the law of this case that the record before the
Supreme Court of the United States established, as a matter
of law, that applicant, without conflict, proved that he
possessed a good moral character and was a loyal citizen.
The present record is even stronger in this respect. If it be
taken as established as a matter of law that applicant possesses
such a character and is loyal, the two statutory requirements
involved, of what relevancy is it that he refused to answer
questions as to his political affiliations' The holding that mere
refusal to answer the questions justified refusing certification,
under the Cil·l"IlIDstances here, necessarily violates the law of
the case as established by the high court.
.
Stated another way, if tbe record before the high court
established these facts as a matter of law, the record now
before this court also, necessarily, shows these facts as a matter
of law. Therefore, it is a necessary condusion from the
majority opinion that although Konigsberg affirmatively

o

sustained the burden of showing hy very substantial and uucontradicted evidence that he pos.'{csscs a good moral character and is a loyal citizcn, and although the recol'd will support no other conclusion, he may be denied admission solely
because he refused to cooperate by answering questions about
his political affiliations. Thus, although the petitioner has
affirmatively sustained his burden of proof, and there is no
evidence or inference from the evidence to the contrary, th~
majority hold that he may be denied relief solely because he
refused to answer questions as to his political affiliations.
For these reasons, and also for the reasons stated in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor, I would grant the
petition of Konigsberg and admit him to the bar of this state.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied November 10, 1959. Gibson, C. J., deeming himself disqualified,
did not participate therein. Draper, J., sat pro tempore- in
place of the Chief Justice. Traynor, Acting C. J., and
Peters, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.

